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Electoral reform and the authorisation of voter ID pilot schemes 
Dr Ben Stanford* 
R (Coughlan) v Minister for the Cabinet Office [2019] EWHC 641 (Admin) 
Introduction 
Following a series of pilot schemes in the May 2018 local elections, which required certain voters 
to produce some form of identification when voting in polling stations, the Cabinet Office 
announced that further pilots would take place in the May 2019 local elections. Neil Coughlan 
is one such voter affected by the requirement to show identification in one of the participating 
areas in the second round of pilots. After a crowd-funding campaign, Coughlan challenged the 
power of the Minister for the Cabinet Office to authorise the pilots pursuant to the Representation 
of the People Act (RPA) 2000.  
In March 2019, Supperstone J dismissed the claim for judicial review, with the local elections 
taking place as scheduled. Looking to the future, the December 2019 Queen’s Speech outlined 
the Government’s plans to reform the constitution and democracy, which would inter alia 
introduce compulsory voter identification requirements at polling stations in general elections in 
Great Britain and local elections in England. 
Facts in Coughlan  
In February and March 2019, Ministerial Orders were made to authorise the second round of 
voter ID pilot schemes that took place in May 2019.1 A total of 10 councils participated, 
including Braintree District Council, meaning that eligible voters in that area were required to 
show either one form of photo ID or up to two forms of non-photo ID.2 The claimant, Neil 
Coughlan, is one such voter who was affected by the requirement to show photo identification, 
which he does not currently possess. After a short crowd-funding campaign prior to the elections, 
Coughlan challenged the power of the Minister for the Cabinet Office to authorise the voter ID 
pilots pursuant to the RPA 2000. The rolled-up hearing was heard on 7 March 2019 before Mr 
Justice Supperstone. 
The claimant argued that the authorisation of the May 2019 voter ID pilots had been an unlawful 
use of s.10 of the RPA 2010. In essence, s.10(2)(a) permits voter ID pilots that allow 
modifications to electoral rules in respect of “when, where and how voting at the elections is to 
take place.” The claimant argued that the meaning of “how” voting can take place should be 
construed narrowly and that “the requirement to produce voter ID does not concern ‘how’ voting 
takes place, but whether voting is permitted to take place at all.”3 Further, the claimant argued 
that the purpose of s.10 was to facilitate voting, which voter identification requirements did not 
do.4 
In response, the defendant argued that the pilot scheme orders were lawful and fell within the 
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scope of s.10(2)(a). More specifically, the defendant argued that the relevant provisions of the 
RPA 2000 permit alterations to local election procedures with respect to “how voting at the 
elections is to take place.”5 These rules are currently governed by the Local Election (Principal 
Areas) (England and Wales) Rules 2006 and the Local Elections (Parishes and Communities) 
(England and Wales) Rules 2006, which concern the questions that may be put to voters in 
polling stations before being handed their ballot papers. Rather than preventing those who are 
lawfully entitled to vote from doing so, the defendant argued that increasing voter confidence 
might actually encourage greater voter participation in the long term.6 Additionally, the 
defendant argued that the voter ID pilots were authorised pursuant to a lawful purpose, that is, 
“with a view to improving the integrity of the electoral system and voter confidence by 
modernising electoral procedures and reducing the opportunity for fraud.” 
The decision of the High Court in Coughlan 
After a careful examination of the RPA 2000, together with the other relevant statutory 
provisions, Supperstone J ruled for the defendant. As Supperstone J acknowledged in his 
introductory remarks, the central question of the case was “whether the voter ID pilots are 
schemes within the meaning of s.10(2)(a), that is, whether they are schemes for testing ‘how 
voting…is to take place’”.7 As such, Supperstone J focussed on two interrelated issues – the 
meaning of the words in the relevant provisions and the purpose of those provisions. 
The meaning of the words used in s.10(2)(a) 
The claimant contended that the “how” matter in s.10(2)(a) refers to the “way or manner in which 
voting occurs, or the (physical) means by which votes are cast,” rather than an individual voter’s 
eligibility or legal entitlement to vote.8 The former interpretation, according to the claimant, was 
consistent with the construction of s.10(2)(a) when read as a whole. The claimant argued that the 
clause concerned the practicalities of voting, in the sense that “when” and “where” referred to 
the time and place of voting, and that “how” should similarly be concerned with the physical 
manner or way of voting, rather than whether voting could take place at all.9 In contrast, the 
defendant submitted that the “how” matter was broad enough to “encompass procedures for 
demonstrating an entitlement to vote, including by proving identity,” and that had Parliament 
intended to confine the provision to the physical manner of voting only it could have done so.10 
On these matters, Supperstone J agreed with the defendant that the “natural and ordinary 
meaning” of the words “how voting at elections is to take place” are sufficiently broad to allow 
procedures which require voters to prove their entitlement to vote.11 Going further, Supperstone 
J agreed that pilot schemes could be authorised that would differ “in any respect” from the 
existing provisions in respect of “how voting” is to take place, which again served to indicate 
the breadth of discretion served upon the Minister for the Cabinet Office.12 
The purposes for which the power under s.10(1) may be exercised 
The lengthiest discussion concerned the contested purpose of the power under s.10(1) of the 
RPA 2000. According to the claimant, the provisions of the RPA 2000 had to be interpreted by 
reference to the purpose and mischief at which it was aimed; that public authorities can only use 
 
5 Ibid, para. 53. 
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9 Ibid, para. 57. 
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statutory powers conferred on them for the purpose conferred; and finally public authorities must 
use statutory powers to promote the statutory policy and objects.13 Moreover, the claimant 
argued that the purpose (or at least the dominant purpose) of pilot schemes under s.10 was to 
facilitate or encourage voting.14 In support, the claimant pointed to the mandatory post-election 
report that must follow a pilot scheme, which requires “an assessment of the scheme’s success 
or otherwise in facilitating voting.”15 
In response, the defendant argued that whilst facilitating or encouraging voting may be an 
objective of pilots, the real policy and objects of the power under s.10 are wider and concern the 
“modernisation of electoral procedures in the public interest.”16 Moreover, the post-election 
report could also include “an assessment of such other matters” that the Secretary of State may 
require.17 On this point, Supperstone J agreed with the defendant, finding that Parliament had 
intended for pilot schemes to test a range of matters and that there “may be a range of important 
public interest considerations associated with the modernisation of electoral procedures 
extending beyond those specified matters.”18 
The claimant also placed great emphasis on the Act’s Explanatory Notes as further evidence that 
the purpose of pilot schemes was to facilitate and encourage voting. In this respect, the 
Explanatory Notes cite the Howarth Report’s recommendations that pilot schemes should test 
innovative electoral procedures such as “weekend voting, electronic voting, early voting, and 
mobility polling stations.”19 However, Supperstone J found that these recommendations were 
not solely concerned with facilitating and encouraging voting, but rather with the “fundamental 
modernisation of the electoral process” and that safeguarding the integrity of the proposed voting 
arrangements was an important consideration.20 
Accordingly, Supperstone J dismissed the claimant’s arguments. Firstly, s.10(1) was 
“permissive” and Parliament had “not specified in express terms the purposes for which the 
power under s.10(1) can be exercised.”21 Secondly, s.10(2)(b) was framed in such a way that 
pilot schemes could be “exercised for purposes other than facilitating and encouraging voters.”22 
Thirdly, the power to allow pilots was “intended to operate to take account of developments in 
the future”, which could be used to “conduct experiments to obtain information about any reform 
to electoral procedure that may need to be introduced from time to time.”23 Fourthly, the s.10(1) 
power had to be “considered in terms of the enactment as a whole.”24 Under s.11 of the RPA 
2000, electoral procedures can be revised in light of successful pilot schemes, which can only be 
executed by a Secretary of State order, via a statutory instrument, following an Electoral 
Commission recommendation, and subject to Parliamentary approval. 
Supperstone J also agreed with the defendant that even if the purpose of pilot schemes was to 
facilitate and encourage voting, the purpose had to be subject to two qualifications.25 Firstly, “the 
voting that is to be facilitated and encouraged must be lawful voting” and secondly, the purpose 
of s.10(1) cannot be limited to pilot schemes that facilitate or encourage voting on the first 
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20 Ibid, para. 73. 
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occasion they are tested; rather, they “must lead to changes in electoral procedure that encourage 
voting over the longer term.”26 Supperstone J also rejected the argument that an individual’s 
right to vote, as a fundamental constitutional right, could only be restricted by clear statutory 
provisions.27 As the defendant argued, “the right to vote at local government elections is 
conferred by statute” and “there is no right to vote at common law.” However, Supperstone J left 
for future deliberation the question as to whether the constitutional right to vote in national 
elections extends to local elections.28 
As a peripheral issue, Supperstone J rejected the defendant’s argument that the claimant had not 
acted promptly in bringing his claim, on the basis that Coughlan “was not required to challenge 
the decision to introduce pilot schemes before he knew that they would affect Braintree.”29 
Tacking electoral fraud or disenfranchising voters?  
Whilst voter verification and identification requirements in broad terms can be traced back 
several decades in the UK, the principal issue contested in this case (the Cabinet Office’s power 
to introduce additional voter ID requirements in pilot schemes in local elections ), can be traced 
back to the late 1990s and the enactment of the Representation of the People Act (RPA) 2000. 
Firstly, in 1998, the House of Commons’ Home Affairs Committee determined that whilst 
reforms to the voting process should be considered, it was not yet necessary to introduce any 
additional requirements for voters to prove their identity when voting in polling stations in Great 
Britain.30 In 1999, a Working Party on Electoral Procedures produced the “Howarth Report”, 
which concluded that it was necessary to modernise the electoral process, and to that end, 
different voting arrangements should be tested in pilot schemes.31 Shortly afterwards, the RPA 
2000 was enacted, which provides for the possibility of pilot schemes in local elections pursuant 
to ss.10 and 11 of the Act. Several pilot schemes have been conducted since then, including 
remote electronic voting, the requirement to provide signatures at polling stations, postal voting 
signature checking and postal vote tracking. Most significantly, in 2014 the Electoral 
Commission suggested that voters in Great Britain should be required to prove their identity to 
improve the security of the voting process,32 which was echoed shortly afterwards in the 2016 
“Pickles Report.”33 
In the May 2018 local elections, the first round of pilots testing voter identification were held in 
Bromley, Gosport, Watford, Woking and Swindon, where voters were required to show some 
form of identification when voting in polling stations.34 The exact requirements differed in each 
area, but generally required voters to show either their polling cards or some form of photo or 
non-photo identification. Whilst the 2018 voter ID pilots attracted criticism from some 
 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid, para. 83. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid, para. 87. 
30 House of Commons’ Home Affairs Committee, Electoral Law and Administration (HC 1997-1998, 768-1) para. 
102. 
31 Home Office, Final Report of the Working Party on Electoral Procedures (not printed, 19 October 1999) paras. 
3.1.3-3.1.6. 
32 Electoral Commission, Electoral Fraud in the UK: Final Report and Recommendations (January 2014) at  
https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/164609/Electoral-fraud-review-final-
report.pdf p. 5. The practice is now relatively uncontroversial and even welcomed by many in Northern Ireland as 
a means to improve voter confidence, where voter identification has been required since 1985 and photo 
identification since 2003. 
33 Securing the Ballot: Report of Sir Eric Pickles’ Review into Electoral Fraud (August 2016). 
34 See generally Electoral Commission, May 2018 Voter Identification Schemes: Findings and Recommendations 




academics and campaigning organisations,35 the Electoral Commission concluded that they had 
“worked well” overall, but that “a small number of people…were unable to vote because they 
did not have, or did not bring with them, the right type of identification.”36 The Cabinet Office 
deemed them a success and announced shortly afterwards that a further round of pilots would be 
conducted in the May 2019 local elections, which would involve a more diverse range of 
councils.37  
The voter ID pilots took place as planned on 2 May 2019 in the 10 participating councils, 
including Braintree District Council. Although Supperstone J made it clear that “this court is not 
concerned with the merits of the decision to introduce the pilot schemes”, he also acknowledged 
that voter identification reforms are controversial.38 In that respect, the claimant in this first, 
unsuccessful, legal challenge to the Cabinet Office’s decision to test enhanced voter 
identification procedures has already sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.39 
Whilst any formal critique of the pilot schemes is beyond the scope of this piece, it appears that 
two things are certain. Firstly, the Government remains resolute and determined to implement 
voter ID reforms nationwide, but also to safeguard elections in the UK in other ways.40 Secondly, 
it is highly unlikely that criticism of the proposals to roll out compulsory voter identification 
nationwide will dissipate. To some extent echoing the 2018 voter ID pilots, evidence from the 
May 2019 pilots suggests that several dozen voters were effectively prevented from voting due 
to the lack of adequate identification in polling stations.41 The task of considering the actual 
merits of voter ID reforms therefore, including the considerable human rights concerns, may 
well fall to other courts. 
Looking to the future, following the Conservative Party’s victory in the December 2019 General 
Election, the subsequent Queen’s Speech outlined the Government’s proposals to reform the 
constitution and democracy in a number of ways.  This will include the creation of a Constitution, 
Democracy and Rights Commission with a view to repealing the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act 
2011 and to introduce voter ID at UK parliamentary elections and local elections in England.42 
Additionally, the Government has proposed to reform postal and proxy voting, to allow a wider 
range of people to assist disabled voters in polling stations, to allow British citizens overseas to 
 
35 Ben Stanford, ‘The 2018 English Local Elections ID Pilots and the Right to Vote: A Vote of (no) Confidence?’ 
(2018) 23(6) European Human Rights Law Review 600; Heather Green, ‘The Voter ID Pilots: An Unlawful 
Electoral Experiment’ (2019) Public Law 242; Michela Palese and Chris Terry, ‘A Sledgehammer to Crack a Nut: 
The 2018 Voter ID Trials’, Electoral Reform Society (September 2018) at https://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2018/09/2018-Voter-ID-Trials.pdf. 
36 Electoral Commission, May 2018 Voter Identification Schemes: Findings and Recommendations (July 2018). 
37 Cabinet Office, ‘Government Commits to New Round of Voter ID Pilots at Next Local Elections’, Press Release 
(19 July 2018) at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-commits-to-new-round-of-voter-id-pilots-at-
next-local-elections; Cabinet Office, ‘Next Round of Voter ID pilots Announced for 2019’, Press Release (3 
November 2018) at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/next-round-of-voter-id-pilots-announced-for-2019. 
38 R. (Coughlan) v Minister for the Cabinet Office [2019] EWHC 641 (Admin) para. 3. 
39 Leigh Day, ‘Essex Man Set to Appeal High Court Ruling that Government's Voter ID Pilots are Lawful’ (20 
March 2019) at https://www.leighday.co.uk/News/2019/March-2019/Essex-man-set-to-appeal-High-Court-ruling-
that-Gov. 
40 Cabinet Office, ‘Government Safeguards UK Elections’, Press Release (5 May 2019) at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-safeguards-uk-elections. 
41 See for example, Rob Parsons, ‘Forty-Eight People Turned Away from Polling Booths and Don't Come Back as Craven 
Council Tries Voter ID Scheme in North Yorkshire’, The Yorkshire Post (3 May 2019) at 
https://www.yorkshirepost.co.uk/news/politics/forty-eight-people-turned-away-from-polling-booths-and-don-t-
come-back-as-craven-council-tries-voter-id-scheme-in-north-yorkshire-1-9748374; Dan Bloom, ‘Local Elections: 
Woman, 87, Who’s Voted all her Life Turned Away for Having no ID’, Daily Mirror (2 May 2019) at 
https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/politics/local-elections-woman-87-whos-14984757. 
42 The Queen’s Speech and Associated Background Briefing, on the Occasion of the Opening of Parliament on 
Monday 19 December 2019 at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/queens-speech-december-2019-
background-briefing-notes p. 126. 
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vote in parliamentary elections for life, and finally to consult on electoral integrity with respect 
to foreign influence and digital campaigning.43 .  
The potential risks of voter identification reforms in Great Britain from a human rights 
perspective are discussed in depth elsewhere.44 In essence, the European Court of Human Rights 
has stressed that a number of requirements must be met for any restrictions upon the right to vote 
under Article 3 of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights to be lawful. 
The measures taken by states must not curtail the right to vote in a way that impairs its essence 
and effectiveness; the conditions imposed must be proportionate and pursue a legitimate aim; 
the free expression of the people must not be thwarted; the requirement must be concerned with 
the integrity and effectiveness of the election process; and, if relevant, the exclusion of any group 
of the public must be reconcilable with the purpose of Article 3 of the First Protocol.45 
Furthermore, although voter identification is, on the face of it, a neutral policy that would 
concern all eligible voters, the European Court of Human Rights has made it clear that indirect 
discrimination may arise in circumstances when the “disproportionately prejudicial effects of a 
general policy or measure which, although couched in neutral terms, discriminates against a 
group.”46 
Bearing in mind these important principles, the 2018 and 2019 voter ID pilots have painted a 
somewhat mixed picture. Despite the legitimate rationale provided by the Government for 
reform and the demonstrable increase in voter confidence in participating areas,47 voter 
identification laws are open to accusations of being disproportionate. This is because of the 
potential risk of a drop in voter turnout, and the fact that several hundred eligible voters were 
effectively denied the right to vote in the May 2018 and 2019 pilots.48 
Ultimately, it might be argued that the Government should not be considering such fundamental 
reforms to electoral law, however well-intentioned the rationale may be, in response to what is 
a relatively insignificant problem and in a way that may in fact discourage or even thwart the 
free expression of the people to choose the legislature. 
Conclusions 
The sole purpose of the Coughlan case was to review the legality of the Cabinet Office’s power 
to authorise the May 2019 voter ID pilot schemes; not to test the merits of compulsory voter 
identification. The impact of the case will thus be limited. Whilst unsuccessful in the High Court, 
the appeal due to be heard in 2020 may shed further light on the legality of the voter ID pilot 
schemes. On the one hand, the Government may well seek to rely upon the findings of the High 
 
43 Ibid, ps. 126-127. 
44 Ben Stanford, ‘Compulsory Voter Identification, Disenfranchisement and Human Rights: Electoral Reform in 
Great Britain’ (2018) 23(1) European Human Rights Law Review 57. 
45 See, in particular, Mathieu-Mohin v Belgium (1988) 10 E.H.R.R. 1; Hirst v United Kingdom (No.2) (2006) 42 
E.H.R.R. 41; Yumak v Turkey (2009) 48 E.H.R.R. 4; Sitaropoulos v Greece (2013) 56 E.H.R.R. 9; Scoppola v Italy 
(2013) 56 E.H.R.R. 19. 
46 Biao v Denmark (2017) 64 E.H.R.R. 1, para. 103; DH v Czech Republic (2008) 47 E.H.R.R. 3, para. 184; Adami 
v Malta (2007) 44 E.H.R.R. 3, para. 80. 
47 Electoral Commission, May 2019 Voter Identification Pilot Schemes: Impact on Voters: Confidence (12 July 
2019) at https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/who-we-are-and-what-we-do/our-views-and-research/our-
research/voter-identification-pilots/may-2019-voter-identification-pilot-schemes/impact-voters-confidence; 
Electoral Commission, May 2018 Voter Identification Schemes: Findings and Recommendations (July 2018) ps. 
14-18.  
48 Electoral Commission, May 2019 Voter Identification Pilot Schemes: Impact on Voters: Experience (12 July 
2019) at https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/who-we-are-and-what-we-do/our-views-and-research/our-
research/voter-identification-pilots/may-2019-voter-identification-pilot-schemes/impact-voters-experience; Ben 
Stanford, ‘The 2018 English Local Elections ID Pilots and the Right to Vote: A Vote of (no) Confidence?’ (2018) 
23(6) European Human Rights Law Review 600, 605-606. 
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Court (and the Court of Appeal if the appeal is dismissed) as support for their proposals to roll 
out compulsory voter identification laws nationwide. On the other hand, if the appeal is 
successful, opponents of voter ID will undoubtedly seek to increase their support and pressurise 
the Government to scrap the proposals. Ultimately, future legal challenges will need to engage 
with the substantive issues that such reforms raise vis-à-vis the right to vote, especially in respect 
of the legality and proportionality of such measures.  
